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1. Introduction
This chapter provides a comprehensive state-of-the-art description of the emerging field of
physical layer security. We will consider wireless security from an information theoretic view,
which allows us to talk about provable secrecy and to derive ultimate secrecy limits. Our
main focus is on the optimization of transmit strategies and resource allocation schemes under
secrecy constraints.
We will consider the following scenario, which is illustrated in Figure 1: Alice wants to send a
private message to Bob, which should be kept perfectly secret from Eve. Eve listens and tries
to decode the message that Alice sends to Bob.
Alice
Bob
Eve
communication
network
Fig. 1. Communication system with a transmitter (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob) and an
eavesdropper (Eve).
In this communication system, Alice is the transmitter, Bob is the intended or legitimate re-
ceiver, and Eve is the eavesdropper. We assume that Bob and Eve perfectly know their in-
dividual channel realization and that Alice has full channel state information (CSI), i.e., she
knows all channel realizations perfectly. This assumption, which is essential for our further
discussion, seems to be unrealistic in the wiretap setting in which Eve probably only listens.
However, this assumption will be justified, if Bob and Eve are both users in a cellular environ-
ment using up- and downlink transmission.
Within this chapter, we give an overview on the research problems and current results con-
cerning secrecy on the physical layer. In the first section, we describe the attacker model and
some conventional cryptographic methods. Afterwards, we introduce the wiretap channel
and define the secrecy on the physical layer. In the second part of the chapter, we present
results for the achievable secrecy rates or the secrecy capacity in various single-user systems
including single-antenna, multi-antenna and multi-carrier systems and provide power alloca-
tion strategies for secrecy rate optimizations. In the third section, we extend these results to
*Part of this work is supported by DFG under grant Jo 801/2-1.
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multi-user systems. We study basic elements that can be used to model more complex net-
works and give an overview on current research results on the secrecy capacity regions or
the secrecy rate regions. The chapter is completed with a discussion of the results and open
research problems.
1.1 Attacker Model
We consider a wireless communication system and focus on a cellular system. The transmitter
has perfect CSI for the channels to all potential receivers, irrespective of the fact, whether
the receiver is a legitimate receiver or an eavesdropper. The receivers only know their own
channels perfectly using channel estimation based on pilot signals. Every user of the system
has knowledge of the structure of the system, including all technical details, e.g., codebooks
and transmit strategies.
system • wireless communication (cellular system)
transmitter
knowledge? • perfect CSI for the channels to both, the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper
• structure of the system (including all technical details, e.g., code-
books and transmit strategies)
legitimate receiver
knowledge? • only perfect CSI for his own channel
• structure of the system (including all technical details, e.g., code-
books and transmit strategies)
eavesdropper
who? • member of the system
objective? • passive attack, eavesdrops the communication between transmitter
and legitimate receiver, undermines confidentiality of communica-
tion (without interfering)
how? • within range of transmitter
• tries to decode the intercepted message
knowledge? • only perfect CSI for his own channel
• structure of the system (including all technical details, e.g., code-
books and transmit strategies)
Table 1. Attacker model at a glance.
The attacker is a passive attacker. He wants to undermine the confidentiality by eavesdrop-
ping the communication of one or more legitimate users of the system without interfering the
communication between transmitter and receivers. For this reason, we use the terms attacker
and eavesdropper synonymously. The attacker himself is also a user of the system. He is in
reach of the transmitter and tries to decode the intercepted message. He has perfect CSI for
the channel from the transmitter to himself, but he does not know the channel between the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver. Since the eavesdropper is a user of the system, the
transmitter knows the channel to the attacker and is able to fend the attack.
An overview of all important facts of the attacker model can be found in Table 1.
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1.2 Cryptography
Currently, the mostly used method to ensure confidentiality in communication systems is the
end-to-end cryptography (Schneier, 1996). What all cryptographic algorithms have in com-
mon is the fundamental attacker model. The sender, namely Alice, wants to send a message to
the receiver, called Bob. Eve, the eavesdropper, should not obtain any knowledge of the mes-
sage content. In order to achieve this, Alice performs a number of mathematical operations
on the original message, predetermined by the cryptographic algorithm and the encryption
key. Bob, who knows which algorithm was used, decrypts the cipher message with his key.
Eve may know the algorithm, but as long as she does not know the key, it is difficult for her
to decipher the message.
There are two basic concepts in the field of cryptography, the symmetric and the asymmet-
ric cryptography. One of the main differences between both concepts is located in the key
management.
w
encryption
e(w,k)
decryption
d( ,k)
key
generation
random number
w
r
k
secret area
plaintext ciphertext
key
k
key
= d(e(w,k),k)
Fig. 2. The basic concept of symmetric cryptography, including key generation, key manage-
ment, encryption and decryption.
The classical method of symmetric cryptography requires identical keys at sender and re-
ceiver, as it can be seen in Figure 2. The difficulty is to transmit the key from Alice to Bob
(or vice versa) in a secure and secret way before the communication. In order to avoid this
problem, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman invented in 1976 the basic principles of asym-
metric cryptography, also called public-key cryptography (Diffie & Hellman, 1976). Diffie and
Hellman implemented a key exchange protocol. The first real cryptographic algorithm was
designed by Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman in 1977 at theMassachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), named RSA by the initial letters of the three inventors (Rivest
et al., 1978).
w
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w
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public key
= d(e(w,c),c-1)
Fig. 3. The basic concept of asymmetric cryptography, including key generation, key manage-
ment, encryption and decryption.
As the name public-key cryptography suggests, Alice und Bob do not share the same key
anymore. Figure 3 shows that Bob initially generates a key pair consisting of a public key and
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a private key. Alice, and everyone else, can now encrypt a message, which she would like to
send to Bob, with the published key, whereas only Bob is able to decrypt the ciphertext with
his private key that he has kept secret. Because of this concept, it is not longer necessary to
exchange the encryption key secretly.
Today, we mostly use a mixture of these both concepts. The main message is encrypted by
a symmetric encryption algorithm, whereas the symmetric key is enciphered by public-key
cryptography. By this method, we can combine the advantages of both concepts: the fast
computable encryption and decryption of the symmetric cryptography with the very simple
key management of the asymmetric cryptography.
Since all cryptographic algorithms are assigned to the application layer, it is in the user’s hand
to ensure the secrecy of his data. In this chapter wewant to present a possibility to enhance the
security of the transmitted information without the requirement of cryptographic protocols
and the engagement of the user. This type of secrecy is realized on the physical layer.
1.3 Notation
We use the following mathematical notations throughout the chapter:
• [·]+ = max(0, ·).
• A† is the adjoint matrix of the matrixA, i.e., the conjugate transpose matrix ofA.
• A  0 means that the matrix A ∈ Cn×n is positive semidefinite, where we use the
following definition for positive semidefiniteness, which automatically implies that A
is Hermitian: z†Az is real and z†Az ≥ 0 for all complex vectors z ∈ Cn.
• |x| is the absolute value of a (complex) variable x.
• ‖x‖ is the Euclidean norm of a (real or complex) vector x with ‖x‖ =
√
x†x =√
∑
n
i=1 |xi|2, if we assume a vector of length n.
• Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower and upper case bold symbols, respectively.
• Vectors are column vectors if not stated otherwise.
1.4 The Wiretap Channel
channel 1
channel 2
X
Z
Y
Alice Bob
Eve
(a) The degraded wiretap channel.
channel 1
channel 2
Y
Z
X
Alice Bob
Eve
(b) The non-degraded wiretap channel.
Fig. 4. Two models for the wiretap channel.
The first important results in this research area were presented by Wyner and by Csiszár and
Körner. They provided the theoretical basis and introduced two basic system models that are
still used today: the wiretap channel (Wyner, 1975), which was later referred to as degraded
wiretap channel, and the non-degraded wiretap channel (Csiszár & Körner, 1978). Both sys-
tem models are depicted in Figure 4.
From a system theoretic view, themodels are characterized by random variables at the channel
inputs and channel outputs. For the channel input of channel 1 (Alice), we use the random
variable X. The channel output of channel 1 (Bob) and channel 2 (Eve) are referred to as Y and
Z, respectively. The corresponding channel input or output alphabets are written as X , Y and
Z .
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In Wyner’s degraded wiretap channel, Bob receives a signal that was transmitted over chan-
nel 1, the so-called main channel, whereas Eve observes a signal that was additionally sent
over channel 2, the so-called wiretapper channel. Therefore, Eve’s received signal is always a
degraded or noisier version of Bob’s received signal, i.e., the random variables form a markov
chain X → Y → Z. This fact simplifies the analysis and derivation of ultimate secrecy limits
inWyner’s model compared to the model of Csiszár and Körner. In the non-degraded wiretap
channel of Csiszár and Körner, the channels to Bob and Eve are supposed to be independent
from each other. In principle, this model does not allow a statement, which channel is the bet-
ter one. However, it is more suitable for the discussion of secrecy in mobile communication
systems.
1.5 Secrecy on the Physical Layer from an Information Theoretic View
From an information theoretic view, the system can be characterized as follows. A message
from the message setW = {1, 2, . . . , M}with M = 2n RS is to be transmitted in n channel uses
while ensuring information theoretic security. The messages are chosen at random and thus
are modeled by a random variable W with alphabetW . Then, the message is encoded by the
encoding function
fenc : W → X
n, w → x(n),
which takes the channel state information at the transmitter into account. Since the messages
are random, the input to the channel is random too, and is modeled by the random vector
X(n). The output of the channel at the legitimate receiver is denoted by Y (n). It is decoded
by the decoding function
fdec : Y
n →W , y(n) → wˆ,
which takes the channel state information at the receiver into account. An (M, n)-code com-
prises a message setW , an encoding function fenc and a decoding function fdec.
The average decoding error probability P
(n)
e of such a code is defined as
P
(n)
e =
1
M
M
∑
w=1
Pr( fdec(Y
(n)) = w |X(n) = fenc(w)),
which is the real decoding error probability, if the messages are uniformly distributed.
The level of secrecy is measured by the uncertainty of Eve about the message W, which was
sent by Alice, under the condition that Eve receives Z(n). This measure is called equivocation
rate and is given with the conditional entropy function H by
R
(n)
e =
1
n
H(W|Z(n)). (1)
We are interested in secure data transmissions with an achievable secrecy rate RS. A secrecy
rate RS is said to be achievable over the wiretap channel if for any ǫ > 0, there exists an integer
n(ǫ) and a sequence of (M, n)-codes of rate
RS =
1
n
log2 M, (2)
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such that for all n ≥ n(ǫ), the average decoding error probability becomes arbitrarily small,
i.e.,
P
(n)
e ≤ ǫ, (3)
and the security constraint
1
n
H(W|Z(n)) ≥ RS − ǫ (4)
is fulfilled.
For perfect secrecy, i.e., ǫ = 0, the secrecy capacity CS is the supremum of all achievable rates
that guarantee the secrecy of the transmitted data. This means, it can be proven that it is the
tightest upper bound on the amount of information that can be reliably transmitted to the
receiver and perfectly kept secret from the eavesdropper.
By now, we only focus on Gaussian wiretap channels and Gaussian wiretap channels with
an additional attenuation of the transmit signal. For the degraded Gaussian wiretap channel,
which was introduced by (Leung-Yan-Cheong & Hellman, 1978) and whose structure is equal
to that ofWyner’s wiretap channel (cf. Figure 4), the secrecy capacity is given by themaximum
difference of mutual informations:
CS = max
fX∈F
[
I(X;Y)− I(X;Z)
]
, (5)
where F is the set of all probability density functions (pdfs) at the channel input under power
constraint at the transmitter. Since Eve always receives a degraded version of Bob’s signal,
the secrecy capacity in (5) is always non-negative. For the non-degraded Gaussian wiretap
channel, which is structured like the model of Csiszár and Körner (cf. Figure 4), the secrecy
capacity is given by a slightly modified term:
CS = max
fX∈F
[
I(X;Y)− I(X;Z)
]+
, (6)
i.e., the secrecy capacity CS is set to zero, if Eve has a better channel realization than Bob. In
the following, we will use the non-degraded system model, if it is not stated otherwise. The
mutual information terms I(X;Y) and I(X;Z) are concave in fX . This allows us to formulate
a lower bound RS for the secrecy capacity CS:
CS = max
fX∈F
[
I(X;Y)− I(X;Z)
]+
≥
[
max
fX∈F
(I(X;Y))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
channel capacity
from Alice to Bob
− max
fX∈F
(I(X;Z))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
channel capacity
from Alice to Eve
]+
= RS. (7)
Note that the secrecy rate RS is definedwith the difference of the channel capacities fromAlice
to Bob and fromAlice to Eve. This lower bound RS is often used for a simplified calculation of
achievable secrecy rates since it is known how to maximize the mutual information terms. For
some scenarios, it has already been proven that the secrecy rate RS equals the secrecy capacity
CS, e.g., for the single-user system with multiple antennas (see Section 2.3) or for the MISO
and MIMO broadcast channel (see Section 3.1).
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1.6 The Basic System Model and Preliminaries
Now, we consider Gaussian channels with an additional attenuation of the transmit signal.
As a basis for all system models, which are used throughout this chapter, we introduce the
following system model for each channel use:
y = h · x + φ and
z = g · x + ψ (8)
with Alice’ transmit signal x, channel coefficients h and g to model the signal attenuation for
the channels from Alice to Bob and from Alice to Eve, additive white Gaussian noise φ and ψ
and signals y and z at the receivers of Bob and Eve, respectively. Figure 5 illustrates how the
basic system model is independently used n times to transmit the codeword of length n that
is chosen for the message.
encoderW
X(n)
Alice
Y(n)
decoder
Bob
decoder
Z(n)
?
H(W|Z(n))
Eve
W
h
g
Fig. 5. The basic system model.
For the system model, we make the following assumptions:
• The variables φ, ψ and x are stochastically independent.
• The noise variables φ and ψ are circular symmetric complex Gaussian distributed with
zero mean and variance σ2. We write φ,ψ ∼ CN (0, σ2).
• At the transmitter, we have a power constraint P, i.e., for a codeword x of length n
1
n
n
∑
i=1
|xi|
2 ≤ P. (9)
In order to achieve the channel capacities in (7), the variable x has to be circular
symmetric complex Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variance P. We write
x ∼ CN (0, P).
• We define the so called channel gains α and β by
α = |h|2 and β = |g|2. (10)
In this model, Bob’s and Eve’s signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is given by αP
σ2
and
βP
σ2
, respectively.
Therewith, the secrecy rate RS can be quantified in bit per complex symbol (bpcs) and ex-
pressed as a function of the transmit power constraint P:
RS(P) =
[
log2
(
1+
αP
σ2
)
− log2
(
1+
βP
σ2
)]+
[bpcs], (11)
where a Gaussian codebook maximizes both mutual information terms in (7). This is the
secrecy rate of the non-degraded Gaussian wiretap channel with channel gains α and β.
www.intechopen.com
Trends in Telecommunications Technologies420
Based on the model above, we define a system with slow quasi-static block flat fading. In
order to model flat fading, the channel coefficients h and g in (8) become random variables,
which we call channel states. We assume slow quasi-static block fading, i.e., the channel states
are random but remain constant for a sufficiently long time to transmit a whole codeword.
The next channel state is independent of all other channel states before and is identically
distributed.
For every channel state, the secrecy rate can be calculated according to (11). Therefore, the
secrecy rate is called instantaneous secrecy rate. Depending on the statistics assumed for the
channel coefficients, we can calculate average or outage secrecy rates as defined in (Bloch
et al., 2008). In the following sections, we present instantaneous secrecy rates for given chan-
nel coefficients and average secrecy rates, where we make the following assumptions for the
distribution of the channel states: The channel coefficients h and g are stochastically indepen-
dent of each other, the transmit signal, and the noise variables. They are circular symmetric
complex Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variance 1. We write h, g ∼ CN (0, 1). This
means, we add Rayleigh fading to the Gaussian wiretap channel.
The interesting observation in (Bloch et al., 2008) for wiretapped fading channels is that even if
the average channel quality between transmitter and eavesdropper is better than the average
channel between transmitter and intended receiver, the average secrecy capacity can still be
positive.
1.7 Extension to a Multi-Carrier or a Multi-Antenna System Model
The system model in Section 1.6 can be extended to a multi-carrier or a multi-antenna system
model:
• For an ideal multi-carrier system with L carriers, the system model in (8) is used L
times in parallel. For each carrier ℓ, we have the same assumptions and the same re-
lations between the variables as listed in Section 1.6. Besides, the transmit signals and
the noise variables are assumed to be independent between the L carriers. For corre-
sponding variables, we assume an identical distribution. If we assume random channel
coefficients, the L parallel channel coefficients for the channels from Alice to Bob are
correlated in general. The same applies to the L parallel channel coefficients for the
channels from Alice to Eve. The power constraint P at the transmitter becomes a sum
power constraint over all L carriers, i.e., ∑Lℓ=1 Pℓ = P.
• In multi-antenna (muliple-input multiple-output, MIMO) systems, we assume that
Alice has mA transmit antennas, Bob has mB receive antennas, and Eve has mE receive
antennas. Then, the system model in Section 1.6 is expanded by using vectors and
matrices instead of scalars. The assumptions and relations between the variables men-
tioned in this context in Section 1.6 are still valid or can be formulated analogously. Each
noise vector consists of independent and identically distributed components. However,
the channels fromAlice to Bob can be spatially correlated. The same applies to the chan-
nels from Alice to Eve. The power constraint P at the transmitter becomes a sum power
constraint over all antennas, which is written as trace(Q) = P with the covariance ma-
trixQ of the transmit signal vector x.
In the multi-carrier or multi-antenna scenario, Alice has more degrees of freedom than before.
Now, she can variate the power allocation (under the sum power constraint) over L carriers
or mA antennas to achieve a high secrecy rate for the data transmission to Bob. Note that
both models can be combined to have a MIMOmulti-carrier system. In the following parts of
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Section 2, we will derive an optimal power allocation that maximizes the achievable secrecy
rate to Bob for multi-carrier or multi-antenna scenarios.
The channel capacities, which we use in the secrecy rate formula in (11) or in secrecy rate ex-
pressions derived from it, are concave functions in P or Q. But the difference of two concave
functions generally is neither convex nor concave. Therefore, finding the optimal power allo-
cation over L carriers or mA antennas under a sum power constraint is a difficult, non-convex
optimization problem.
1.8 Extension to a Multi-User Scenario
So far, we have considered a single-user scenario, where Alice wants to transmit a private
message to Bob, and Eve is a passive eavesdropper who wants to decode this message. Now,
we want to introduce a multi-user scenario with one transmitter (Alice) and K receivers. Alice
wants to transmit private messages to each of the K users and to keep these messages secret
from all other users. In such a system, we have K secrecy rates or a K-dimensional secrecy rate
region. In this chapter, we will confine ourselves to the 2-user scenario with the receivers Bob
and Eve, who are now both: legitimate receiver of one message and potential eavesdropper
of the other.
In some multi-user scenarios that we present in Section 3, the signals for the different users
can interfere. For the evaluation of the achievable secrecy rates for the 2-user case, we slightly
modify the definition of the secrecy rate in (7). For the individual secrecy rates, we use the
signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) for the legitimate user, where the complete in-
terference from the other user’s signal is simply treated as additional noise, and the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) for the eavesdropper. Under power constraint PB + PE = P, Alice allocates
power PB and PE for the data transmission to Bob and Eve, respectively. This results in the
following expression for the achievable secrecy rate RSB for the transmission to Bob:
RSB(PB, PE) =
[
log2
(
1+
αPB
σ2 + αPE
)
− log2
(
1+
βPB
σ2
)]+
[bpcs]. (12)
This is a worst-case assumption since we assume that Eve performs successive interference
cancellation (SIC), i.e., first, she is able to detect her own data, afterwards she subtracts it from
her received signal and tries to decode the message for Bob.
The achievable secrecy rate for the transmission to Eve can be formulated in the same way:
RSE(PB, PE) =
[
log2
(
1+
βPE
σ2 + βPB
)
− log2
(
1+
αPE
σ2
)]+
[bpcs]. (13)
2. Secrecy Capacity in Single-User Systems
2.1 Single-Antenna Systems
For a single-user single-antenna system, we have already presented the secrecy rate in Section
1.6. For this single-input single-output (SISO) system, the secrecy rate given in (11) is exactly
the secrecy capacity given in (6). In this scenario, Alice only has the choice to transmit the
message to Bob or not, according to the channel coefficients for the channels to Bob and Eve.
In a completely static system, this would result in a constant secrecy rate that is either positive
or zero all the time. But in a time-varying systemwhere we assume slow quasi-static block flat
fading, the situation changes from block to block: we have instantaneous channel realizations
and thus instantaneous secrecy rates, which can be averaged in time.
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2.2 Multi-Carrier Systems
In this section, we extend the basicmodel from Section 1.6 to themulti-carrier wiretap channel,
where Alice wants to send a private message to Bob in a system with L parallel carriers. This
message should be kept secret from the eavesdropper Eve. This is a single-antenna scenario
since every member of the system has only one transmit or receive antenna. We study the
resource allocation under the secrecy constraint and a sum power constraint over all carriers.
carrier L
encoderWL
XL(n)
Alice
YL(n)
decoder
decoder
ZL(n)
?
H(WL|ZL(n))
Eve
WL
Bob
hL
gL
carrier 1
encoderW1
X1(n)
Alice
Y1(n)
decoder
decoder
Z1(n)
?
H(W1|Z1(n))
Eve
W1
Bob
h1
g1
Fig. 6. The multi-carrier wiretap channel with L carriers.
The systemmodel is modified as described in Section 1.7 and illustrated in Figure 6. On carrier
ℓ with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L, Bob and Eve observe the received signals yℓ and zℓ, respectively:
yℓ = hℓxℓ + φℓ and
zℓ = gℓxℓ + ψℓ (14)
with Alice’ transmit signal xℓ, channel coefficients hℓ, gℓ, and noise variables φℓ and ψℓ. The
assumptions listed for the basic system model in Section 1.6 also apply to this model. The
channel gains αℓ, βℓ are defined according to equation (10).
In this multi-carrier system, the secrecy rate is the sum over all secrecy rates per carrier, which
can be computed according to (7), and is given by
RS(PB) =
L
∑
ℓ=1
[
log2
(
1+
αℓPB ℓ
σ2
)
− log2
(
1+
βℓPB ℓ
σ2
)]+
[bpcs], (15)
where PB ℓ is the power that Alice allocates to carrier ℓ in order to transmit the message to Bob.
The power allocation over all carriers can be written in a vector PB = (PB 1, . . . , PB L).
We derive the single-user optimal power allocation for maximizing the secrecy rate in this
multi-carrier system under sum power constraint P over all carriers:
max
PB
RS(PB) subject to
L
∑
ℓ=1
PB ℓ ≤ P and PB ℓ ≥ 0. (16)
This is a non-convex optimization problem with objective function RS.
The optimal power allocation that solves (16) is to allocate zero power to all carriers with
αℓ ≤ βℓ:
∀ ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} : αℓ ≤ βℓ =⇒ PB ℓ = 0. (17)
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The proof is based on the necessary Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions (Jors-
wieck & Wolf, 2008). Furthermore, it was shown that the remaining optimization problem
max
PB
RS(PB) subject to
L
∑
ℓ=1
PB ℓ ≤ P, PB ℓ ≥ 0 and PB ℓ = 0 for αℓ ≤ βℓ (18)
is convex (see (Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2004) for general convex optimization theory).
The optimal power allocation is a type of waterfilling (see (Cover & Thomas, 2006) for stan-
dard waterfilling). We give the solution in implicit form with
PB ℓ =


0 if αℓ ≤ βℓ[
−
σ2(αℓ+βℓ)
2αℓβℓ
+
√
σ4(αℓ−βℓ)2
4(αℓβℓ)2
+ 1µ
σ2(αℓ−βℓ)
ln(2)αℓβℓ
]+
otherwise
(19)
and µ > 0 such that
L
∑
ℓ=1
PB ℓ = P. (20)
However, the typical order of the channels is different from standard waterfilling. For small
SNR, the carriers are ordered according to (αℓ − βℓ), i.e., the carrier with largest (αℓ − βℓ) is
supported first, whereas for high SNR, the carriers are ordered according to αℓβℓ .
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Fig. 7. Average channel capacities and average achievable secrecy rates for transmission from
Alice to Bob in a multi-carrier system with 20 and 200 independent carriers.
In Figure 7, we compare the average achievable secrecy rate with the average channel capacity
of the single-user multi-carrier channel for different numbers of carriers. The main observa-
tion is that the high SNR channel capacity grows without bound whereas the secrecy rate
is bounded because the mutual information between the transmitter and the eavesdropper
is subtracted from the rate. If the number of carriers is increased, the asymptotic behavior
will remain the same. However, the high SNR bound is shifted to the right. We see that in
multi-carrier systems with a large number of carriers (and corresponding multipath fading),
the costs of security are decreased, i.e., the high SNR bound is increased.
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2.3 Multi-Antenna Systems
In this section, we extend the basic model from Section 1.6 to the multi-antenna wiretap chan-
nel. As in the scenarios above, Alice wants to send a private message to Bob, which should
be kept secret from the eavesdropper Eve. Now, we consider a multi-antenna system, where
Alice has mA transmit antennas, Bob and Eve have mB and mE receive antennas, respectively.
We study the resource allocation under the secrecy constraint and a sum power constraint
over all transmit antennas.
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Fig. 8. The multi-antenna wiretap channel.
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Fig. 9. The structure of a channel matrix using the example of channel matrix H for the
channels from Alice to Bob.
The system model, which is depicted in Figure 8, is modified as described in Section 1.7. It
can be described by
y = H · x+φ and
z = G · x+ψ. (21)
The complex channel coefficients are written as the components ofH andG, which are chan-
nel matrices of dimension [mB × mA] and [mE × mA], respectively. Figure 9 illustrates the
structure of such a channel matrix. Alice’ transmit signals are written in a column vector x of
dimension [mA × 1]. The noise variables φ and ψ are column vectors of dimension [mB × 1]
and [mE × 1], respectively, with independent components. Bob’s and Eve’s received signals y
and z are column vectors of dimension [mB × 1] and [mE × 1], respectively. The assumptions
listed for the basic system model in Section 1.6 analogously apply to this model. The transmit
vector x, and the noise vectors φ and ψ are stochastically independent, i.e., the components
of one vector are stochastically independent of the components of the other vectors. The noise
vectors are composed of independent and circular symmetric complex Gaussian distributed
components. Their covariance matrices are normalized to the identity matrix. For fading sce-
narios, the channel matrices H and G are assumed to be stochastically independent of each
other, the transmit vector x, and the noise vectors φ and ψ.
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In this multi-antenna system, the secrecy rate, which is the secrecy capacity for this scenario
(Oggier & Hassibi, 2008), is given by
RS(Q) =
[
log2 det(ImB +HQH
†)− log2 det(ImE +GQG
†)
]+
[bpcs]. (22)
ImB and ImE are identity matrices of dimension [mB × mB] and [mE × mE], respectively. Q is
the covariance matrix of the input signal vector x, i.e.,Q = Cov (x) = E
(
xx†
)
.
We derive the single-user optimal power allocation for maximizing the secrecy rate in this
multi-antenna system under sum power constraint P over all transmit antennas:
max
Q
RS(Q) subject to trace(Q) ≤ P and Q  0. (23)
This is a non-convex optimization problem, which we analyze for some special cases.
Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO) Systems
In theMISO case, where Bob and Eve have only one receive antenna each, the channelmatrices
H andG in (21) reduce to row vectors h and g of dimension [1×mA]:
h = (h1, . . . , hmA ) and g = (g1, . . . , gmA ). (24)
The secrecy rate in (22) can be written as
RS(Q) =
[
log2(1+ hQh
†)− log2(1+ gQg
†)
]+
[bpcs]. (25)
This scenario was analytically solved in (Li et al., 2007). The authors used an invertible coor-
dinate transformation with a unitary transformation matrix
T =

 h†
‖h‖
,
(g − ‖g‖
‖h‖
ζh)†
‖g‖
√
1− ζ†ζ
, further (mA − 2) columns

 with ζ = gh
†
‖g‖ ‖h‖
, (26)
where the last (mA − 2) columns are an orthonormal basis for the (mA − 2) dimensions and
orthogonal to the first two columns. Therewith, the transformed channel vectors hT and g T
have zeros in the subspace spanned by the last (mA − 2) columns of T . Focussing only on the
subspace spanned by the first two columns of T the transformed channel vectors hT and g T
can be represented by h¯ and g¯ with
h¯ = ‖h‖ (1, 0) and g¯ = ‖g‖ (ζ,
√
1− ζ†ζ). (27)
In the transformed space, the covariance matrix with the optimal power allocation for the
optimization problem derived from (23) for the MISO scenario is
Q¯ = Pq¯q¯†, (28)
where q¯ is the generalized eigenvector corresponding to the largest generalized eigenvalue
of the two matrices (I2 + Ph¯
†h¯) and (I2 + Pg¯
†g¯). The covariance matrix Q¯ has unit-rank,
which means that only one data stream is supported at the transmitter and beamforming can
be applied with vector q¯. Finally, the optimal covariance matrix Q in the orginal space is
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obtained by adding zeros for the subspace spanned by the last (mA− 2) columns of T and the
inverse coordinate transformation.
In Figure 10, the difference between the average achievable secrecy rate and the average chan-
nel capacity of the single-user MISO scenario is illustrated for different numbers of transmit
antennas.
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Fig. 10. Average channel capacities and average achievable secrecy rates in a MISO system
with two and four transmit antennas and uncorrelated channels.
Single-Input Multiple-Output (SIMO) Systems
In the SIMO case, where Alice has only one transmit antenna and Bob and Eve have an ar-
bitrary number of receive antennas, the channel matrices H and G in (21) reduce to column
vectors of dimension [mB × 1] and [mE × 1], respectively:
h = (h1, . . . , hmB )
T and g = (g1, . . . , gmE )
T. (29)
Similar to the single-antenna (SISO) case in Section 2.1, Alice has only the choice either to
transmit the message to Bob with power P or not. This SIMO scenario can be transformed in
an equivalent SISO scenario with modified channel statistics. Bob and Eve can apply matched
filters at the receivers. In the equivalent SISO scenario, Bob’s SNR is
‖h‖2P
σ2
and Eve’s SNR is
‖g‖2P
σ2
, where P is the transmit power constraint and σ2 is the noise variance for each receive
antenna.
Some Special Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) Systems
In the MIMO 2-2-1 scenario, where Alice has two transmit antennas, Bob has two receive
antennas, whereas Eve has only one single receive antenna, the channel matrices H and G
in (21) reduce to a matrix H of dimension [2× 2] and a row vector g of dimension [1× 2].
The optimization problem derived from (23) for the MIMO 2-2-1 scenario was analytically
solved in (Shafiee et al., 2008). The authors transformed the problem into a Rayleigh quotient
problem, whose solution is the optimal covariance matrixQ:
Q = Pqq†, (30)
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where q is the eigenvector that corresponds to the largest eigenvalue of the matrix (I2 +
Pg†g)−1/2(I2 + PH
†H)(I2 + Pg
†g)−1/2.
For the general MIMO scenario, where each user can have an arbitrary number of antennas, it
has been proven in (Oggier & Hassibi, 2008) that the secrecy rate in (22) is equal to the secrecy
capacity of the system in (21).
In (Liu, Hou & Sherali, 2009), the authors presented a global optimization algorithm called
branch-and-bound with reformulation and linearization technique (BB/RLT). This method
guarantees finding a global optimal solution for the non-convex optimization problem in (23).
Another characterization of the optimal transmit covariance matrix Q is derived in (Liu, Liu,
Poor & Shamai (Shitz), 2009). This approach is discussed in the multi-user context in Section
3.1.
3. Secrecy Rate Region in Multi-User Systems
In this section, we extend some of the previously presented results to the multi-user case. Due
to the fact that there is more than one user, we will not use anymore the terms secrecy rate and
secrecy capacity, but secrecy rate region and secrecy capacity region.
In the literature, the case of one confidential (private) and one public message is often dis-
cussed. We focus on the case, where only confidential messages are sent. For convenience, we
confine ourselves to systems with only two users. The extension to more than two users can
be done straightforward.
3.1 Broadcast Channels
The broadcast channel (BC) is the logical extension of the basic system presented in Section
1.6 to the multi-user scenario. In this channel model, Alice additionally sends a message to
Eve that should be concealed from Bob. This new system setting is shown in Figure 11.
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H(WB|Z(n))
Fig. 11. The basic model of the broadcast channel with two confidential messages.
The extensions of the basic model discussed in Section 2 can also be applied to the broadcast
channel. Based on the results of the single-user multi-carrier scenario in Section 2.2, we con-
sider now a cellular broadcast channel with two users, namely Bob and Eve and reuse the
system model shown in Figure 6.
The system model is equivalent to the model given in (14)
yℓ = hℓxℓ + φℓ and
zℓ = gℓxℓ + ψℓ, (31)
but now Bob and Eve eavesdrop each other. The assumptions listed in Section 1.6 also apply
to this model. The channel gains αℓ and βℓ are defined according to (10).
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On carrier ℓ, Alice allocates power PB ℓ for data transmission to Bob and PE ℓ for data trans-
mission to Eve. The sum power constraint translates to
L
∑
ℓ=1
(PB ℓ + PE ℓ) ≤ P. (32)
We collect the power allocation for Bob and Eve in appropriate vectors, i.e., PB =
(PB 1, . . . , PB L) and PE = (PE 1, . . . , PE L).
The achievable secrecy rates per carrier are modified according to the explanations in Section
1.7 and 1.8. The achievable secrecy rates for data transmission to Bob and Eve are the sum
over all secrecy rates per carrier and given by
RSB(PB,PE) =
L
∑
ℓ=1
[
log2
(
1+
αℓPB ℓ
σ2 + αℓPE ℓ
)
− log2
(
1+
βℓPB ℓ
σ2
)]+
[bpcs] and
RSE(PB,PE) =
L
∑
ℓ=1
[
log2
(
1+
βℓPE ℓ
σ2 + βℓPB ℓ
)
− log2
(
1+
αℓPE ℓ
σ2
)]+
[bpcs]. (33)
The system operator might be interested in the sum of the individual secrecy rates in (33). The
sum secrecy rate is defined as
R
(sum)
S
(PB,PE) = RSB(PB,PE)+ RSE(PB,PE). (34)
The corresponding programming problem maximizes the sum secrecy rate in (34):
max
PB,PE
R
(sum)
S
(PB,PE) subject to
L
∑
ℓ=1
(PB ℓ + PE ℓ) ≤ P, PB ℓ ≥ 0 and PE ℓ ≥ 0. (35)
In (Jorswieck & Wolf, 2008), it was shown that it is optimal to support only the best user per
carrier. From that fact and the power constraint PA ℓ = PB ℓ + PE ℓ per carrier follows the user
allocation per carrier, which is
PB ℓ =
{
PA ℓ if αℓ > βℓ
0 otherwise
and PE ℓ =
{
0 if αℓ ≥ βℓ
PA ℓ otherwise
. (36)
Then, the power allocation per carrier is derived from equation (19) by replacing (αℓ − βℓ) by
(max(αℓ, βℓ)−min(αℓ, βℓ)).
Note that the case αℓ = βℓ can be ignored in the fading scenario, if we assume a continuous
distribution for the channel coefficients and hence the channel gains, since Pr (αℓ = βℓ) = 0.
Moreover, for the spectral power allocation in (19), it is all the same, which user is assumed to
be supported. The algorithm allocates zero power to this carrier and therefore the secrecy rate
on this carrier will be zero.
The previously described sum secrecy rate maximization for the broadcast channel can be
easily extended to the weighted sum secrecy rate maximization as discussed in (Jorswieck &
Gerbracht, 2009). The weighted sum secrecy rate is given by
R
(wsum)
S
(PB,PE,λ) = λRSB(PB,PE)+ (1− λ)RSE(PB,PE) (37)
with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Herewith, the system operator is able to fulfill certain Quality of Service
(QoS) constraints.
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The programming problem that maximizes the weighted sum secrecy rate is given by
max
PB,PE,λ
R
(wsum)
S
(PB,PE,λ) subject to
L
∑
ℓ=1
(PB ℓ + PE ℓ) ≤ P, PB ℓ ≥ 0 and PE ℓ ≥ 0.
The user allocation is equivalent to the case without weighting factor in (36). It is optimal to
support only the best user per carrier.
Furthermore, the spectral power allocation, which is similar to the one in the single-usermulti-
carrier scenario in Section 2.2, is a kind of waterfilling. The optimal power allocation is given
by
PA ℓ =


[
−
σ2(αℓ+βℓ)
2αℓβℓ
+
√
σ4(αℓ−βℓ)2
4α2
ℓ
β2
ℓ
+ λµ
σ2(αℓ−βℓ)
ln(2)αℓβℓ
]+
if ℓ ∈ L1[
−
σ2(αℓ+βℓ)
2αℓβℓ
+
√
σ4(βℓ−αℓ)2
4α2
ℓ
β2
ℓ
+ 1−λµ
σ2(βℓ−αℓ)
ln(2)αℓβℓ
]+
if ℓ ∈ L2
,
where L1 = {ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L} : αℓ > βℓ}, L2 = {1, . . . , L} \ L1 and µ > 0 such that
L
∑
ℓ=1
PA ℓ = P. (38)
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Fig. 12. The average channel capacity region and the average achievable secrecy rate region
for the multi-carrier broadcast channel with eight carriers and two users.
Figure 12 shows the achievable average secrecy rate region for the broadcast channel with
eight carriers compared to the average channel capacity region, which was found by exhaus-
tive search. We observe that the gap between the achievable secrecy rate region and the ca-
pacity region grows with increasing SNR. For SNR→ ∞, we know that the secrecy rate region
does not grow without bound. It is limited by the second term in the equations in (33).
Now, we present the secrecy capacity region for the real-valued MIMO broadcast channel,
which can be found in (Liu, Liu, Poor & Shamai (Shitz), 2009). The system model is given by
Y = Hx+ Φ and
Z = Gx+ Ψ, (39)
www.intechopen.com
Trends in Telecommunications Technologies430
where H and G are real channel matrices of size [mB × mA] and [mE × mA], respectively.
The noise is modeled by vectors of dimension [mB × 1] and [mE × 1]. For the distribution of
the noise vectors, we assume Φ, Ψ ∼ N (0, Imk ) with k ∈ {B, E}. The channel input x is a
vector of the size [mA × 1]. Furthermore, we have an average power constraint, defined by
E
(
‖x‖2
)
≤ P.
The achievable secrecy rates are given by
RSB(QB)
=
[
1
2
log2 det
(
ImB +HQBH
T
ImE +GQBG
T
)]+
[bps] and
RSE(QB,QE)
=
[
1
2
log2 det
(
ImE +G(QB +QE)G
T
ImE +GQBG
T
)
−
1
2
log2 det
(
ImB +H(QB +QE)H
T
ImB +HQBH
T
)]+
[bps],
(40)
whereQB andQE are the covariance matrices for the transmission to Bob and to Eve, respec-
tively. They are positive semidefinite matrices with trace(QB +QE) ≤ P.
For this system model, it has been shown in (Liu, Liu, Poor & Shamai (Shitz), 2009) that the
secrecy capacity region is given by
R =
⋃
0≤trace(QB+QE)≤P
(RSB(QB), RSE(QB,QE)) . (41)
Even though the secrecy capacity region has been proven for the MIMO and the MISO broad-
cast channel (Liang et al., 2009), it is still an open problem to find the secrecy capacity region
for the single-antenna case. So far, there are no results known about the optimal transmit
strategies in MIMO and MISO broadcast channels.
3.2 Multiple Access Channels
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Fig. 13. The multiple access channel (one example).
The multiple access channel (MAC) is difficult to analyze in a system setting concerning se-
crecy on the physical layer. The conventional channel model for the MAC consists of two
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or more transmitters, e.g., mobile devices, and only one receiver, e.g., the base station. In
this model, there is nobody who could eavesdrop the sent messages in accordance with the
attacker model in Section 1.1. However, if the uplink transmission (MAC) and the down-
link transmission (BC) are studied together, every user in the system can eavesdrop all other
users. But from the transmitter’s point of view, the channel model would always be a broad-
cast channel, where all other mobile devices and the base station serve as receivers.
There are currently a lot of research activities concerning the MAC in the secrecy context. One
of the models assumed for the MAC in this case is depicted in Figure 13 and studied in (Liang
et al., 2009). Another channel model is described in (Tekin & Yener, 2006). It deals with the
degraded MAC, where the eavedropper obtains a degraded version of the receiver’s signal.
3.3 Interference Channels
In this section, we will present two results for the interference channel (IFC). The first one will
be a weak interference, single-antenna channel, whereas the second one is a multi-antenna
interference channel. For both channel models, we need an additional sender, called Charly,
as it can be seen in Figure 14.
Alice wants to send a private message to Bob, which should be kept secret from Eve. Further-
more, Charly wants to send a confidential message to Eve, which should be concealed from
Bob. These communication channels have the channel coefficients h and g. The interference
or eavesdropper channels from Alice to Eve and from Charlie to Bob have the coefficients g˜
and h˜, respectively.
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Fig. 14. The interference channel.
The basic system model from Section 1.6 has to be modified to be suitable for the interfer-
ence channel. Nevertheless, the assumptions listed for the basic system model also apply to
this model. For the interference channel, the system model, which was studied in (Zhang &
Gursoy, 2009), is given by
y = hxA + h˜xC + φ and
z = gxC + g˜xA + ψ, (42)
where h, g, h˜ and g˜ are deterministic channel coefficients. xA and xC are the channel inputs at
the transmitters. φ and ψ are independent and circular symmetric complex Gaussian random
variables with CN (0, σ2). The channel causes weak interference, i.e., α˜α < 1 and
β˜
β < 1,
where the channel gains α˜ and β˜ of the eavesdropper channels are defined according to (10)
by α˜ = |h˜|2 and β˜ = |g˜|2. The individual power constraint at the transmitters are given by
E
(
|xA|
2
)
≤ PA and E
(
|xC|
2
)
≤ PC. (43)
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The system model has to be modified according to Section 1.8. The consideration of interfer-
ence results in the achievable secrecy rates given by
RSB(PB, PE) =
[
log2
(
1+
αPB
σ2 + α˜PE
)
− log2
(
1+
β˜PB
σ2
)]+
[bpcs] and
RSE(PB, PE) =
[
log2
(
1+
βPE
σ2 + β˜PB
)
− log2
(
1+
α˜PE
σ2
)]+
[bpcs], (44)
where PB is the power allocated by Alice for data transmission to Bob and PE is the power
allocated by Charly for data transmission to Eve.
The achievable secrecy rate region is given by
R =
⋃
0≤PB≤PA,
0≤PE≤PC
(RSB(PB, PE), RSE(PB, PE)). (45)
Now, we present some results for the multi-antenna interference channel, which are discussed
in (Jorswieck &Mochaourab, 2009) in a game-theoretic context. Both transmitters use mA and
mC antennas, whereas Eve and Bob receive the messages with only one antenna each. The
system model is modified according to Sections 1.7 and 1.8 and is described by
y = h · xA + h˜ · xC + φ and
z = g · xC + g˜ · xA + ψ, (46)
where h and g˜ are row vectors of dimension [1 × mA] and h˜ and g are row vectors of di-
mension [1 × mC] with complex channel coefficients. xA and xC are vectors of dimension
[mA × 1] and [mC × 1] and are independent, circular symmetric, and complex Gaussian dis-
tributed, i.e., xA ∼ CN (0,vAv
†
A) and xC ∼ CN (0,vCv
†
C). The beamforming vectors vA and
vC are of dimensions [mA × 1] and [mC × 1] with ‖vA‖
2 = ‖vC‖
2 = 1. φ and ψ are indepen-
dent white Gaussian noise with variance σ2, i.e., φ,ψ ∼ CN (0, σ2). Both transmitters have a
power constraint P.
The achievable secrecy rate pair for the Gaussian MISO IFC is given by
RSB(vA,vC) =
[
log2
(
1+
|h · vA|
2P
σ2 + |h˜ · vC|2P
)
− log2
(
1+
|g˜ · vA|
2P
σ2
)]+
[bpcs] and
RSE(vA,vC) =
[
log2
(
1+
|g · vC|
2P
σ2 + |g˜ · vA|2P
)
− log2
(
1+
|h˜ · vC|
2P
σ2
)]+
[bpcs]. (47)
The efficient beamforming vectors are described in the following. According to (Jorswieck &
Mochaourab, 2009), we denote the maximum ratio transmission beamforming vector of user
k as v
(MRT)
k and the zero-forcing beamforming vector as v
(ZF)
k , where k ∈ {A,C}. We obtain
vA(λA) =
λA · v
(MRT)
A + (1− λA) · v
(ZF)
A∥∥∥λA · v(MRT)A + (1− λA) · v(ZF)A
∥∥∥ and
vC(λC) =
λC · v
(MRT)
C + (1− λC) · v
(ZF)
C∥∥∥λC · v(MRT)C + (1− λC) · v(ZF)C
∥∥∥ (48)
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with transmit strategies 0 ≤ λA,λC ≤ 1.
The maximization of the secrecy rate from Alice to Bob depends on the given interference
caused by Charly. The rate can be described as the best response, if λC is given:
λ∗A(λC) = arg max
0≤λA≤1
RSB(λA,λC). (49)
Equivalently, Charly’s best response to Alice’ transmit strategy is given by
λ∗C(λA) = arg max
0≤λC≤1
RSE(λA,λC). (50)
From Alice’ and Charly’s point of view, the interference channel equals the broadcast channel.
Because of this fact, they do not have the possibility to influence, but to react to the interference
generated by each other. The optimal solution for the maximization problems in (49) and (50)
can be found by an iterative algorithm described in (Jorswieck & Mochaourab, 2009). This
optimum is not the best solution, which is possible in this scenario. It is an achievable and
stable point, the so-called Nash Equilibrium, that will be reached, if Alice and Charly do not
cooperate. Another approach to solve these non-convex optimization problems is to use a
monotonic optimization framework. This has been proven useful for the MISO interference
channel in (Jorswieck & Larsson, 2009) in order to optimize the transmit strategies.
4. Discussion and Open Problems
The information theoretic description of secrecy capacities and secrecy capacity regions (Liang
et al., 2009) is an important research area to support a better understanding of security on
the physical layer. Based on the secrecy capacity expressions or achievable secrecy rates, the
transmit strategies, including power allocation, beamforming and subcarrier allocation, are
optimized in order to choose a certain operating point. In this chapter, we focus on the opti-
mization of the physical layer transmit strategies for typical wireless communication scenar-
ios.
In single-user scenarios, the system design is more complicated with additional secrecy con-
straints, since the secrecy capacity expressions are in general not concave or convex in the
transmit strategies. The secrecy rate terms usually consist of a difference of two parts. The
first one corresponds to the amount of data that can be reliably transmitted to the intended
user and it is therefore concave in the transmit strategies. The second one corresponds to the
amount of data that is overheard by the eavesdropper and it is thus also concave in the trans-
mit strategies. The resulting transmit optimization problems are non-convex optimization
problems since the difference of two concave functions is not necessarily convex or concave.
However, in the multi-carrier case, the problem can be reduced to a convex optimization prob-
lem that can be efficiently computed. We conjecture that also the multiple antenna (MIMO)
scenario will be completely solved in the very next future.
In multi-user scenarios, the secrecy rate regions of all four elements of network information
theory, the broadcast, the multiple access, the relay, and the interference channel were recently
studied. The attacker models of the MAC and the relay case are more difficult than the well-
motivated ones of the broadcast and the interference channel. Therefore, we focus on the
broadcast and interference channel. The resource allocation for the parallel broadcast channel
without secrecy is involved due to a hard combinatorial problem – the matching of carriers
to users. Interestingly, with secrecy constraints, the resulting programming problem is much
simpler and the optimal power and resource allocation can be solved efficiently. A similar
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observation in the context of interference channels with beamforming and without coopera-
tion shows that the secrecy constraint leads to a more altruistic and less selfish behavior. In
both cases, the additional term in the utility functions simplifies and improves the resulting
transmit optimization.
In addition to the resource allocation and transmit optimization problems discussed in this
chapter, there are many important practical issues to be solved. The assumption to have
perfect CSI at the transmitter(s) and receiver(s) is idealistic. The impact of channel estima-
tion errors and limited feedback on the achievable secrecy rates needs to be analyzed. The
assumption to apply Gaussian codebooks is idealistic, too. Finite modulation and coding
schemes lead to more difficult bit and power allocation problems at the transmitter. Recent
results in the development of channel codes for secure communications are not discussed in
this chapter due to length constraints. However, there is interesting current work on the anal-
ysis and development of channel codes that are able to achieve the secrecy capacity. Finally,
the attacker model studied in this chapter is important but not the only one possible. Future
work will also consider malicious user behavior as well as byzantine attacks. There are many
interesting open problems in the broad area of physical layer security in wireless communica-
tions.
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